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 Constitutional Cases 2003:  
An Overview 
Jamie Cameron* 
Patrick J. Monahan** 
These volumes of the Supreme Court Law Review, which consist of 
papers presented at Osgoode Hall Law School’s 7th Annual Constitu-
tional Cases Conference held on April 2, 2004, examine the constitu-
tional decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada released in the 
calendar year 2003.1 The Court handed down a total of 81 judgments in 
2003,2 24 (or 30 per cent) of which were constitutional cases.3 As in 
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  Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School. 
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  Professor of Law and Dean, Osgoode Hall Law School. We are indebted to Elaine 
Jewitt-Matthen, a member of the Osgoode Hall Law School class of 2006, for her excellent 
research assistance in the preparation of this article. 
1
  A case is defined as a “constitutional case” if the decision of the Court involves the 
interpretation or application of a provision of the “Constitution of Canada,” as defined in s. 52 
of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
2
  Supreme Court of Canada, Statistics 1993 to 2003: Bulletin of Proceedings: Special 
Edition, available online at <http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca>, at 4 (hereinafter “Statistics”). 
3
  The 24 constitutional decisions handed down in calendar year 2003 were as follows: 
Barrie Public Utilities v. Canadian Cable Television Assn., [2003] 1 S.C.R. 476, [2003] 
S.C.J. No. 27 [hereinafter “Barrie Public Utilities”]; Beals v. Saldanha, 2003 SCC 72, [2003] 
S.C.J. No. 77 [hereinafter “Beals”]; Bell Canada v. Canadian Telephone Employees Assn., 
[2003] 1 S.C.R. 884, [2003] S.C.J. No. 36 [hereinafter “Bell Canada”]; Desputeaux v. Édi-
tions Chouette (1987) Inc., [2003] 1 S.C.R. 178, [2003] S.C.J. No. 15 [hereinafter 
“Desputeaux”]; Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3, 
[2003] S.C.J. No. 63 [hereinafter “Doucet-Boudreau”]; Ell v. Alberta, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 857, 
[2003] S.C.J. No. 35 [hereinafter “Ell”]; Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] 1 
S.C.R. 912, [2003] S.C.J. No. 37 [hereinafter “Figueroa”]; Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compen-
sation Board) v. Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Laseur, [2003] 2 
S.C.R. 504, [2003] S.C.J. No. 54 [hereinafter “Martin”]; Paul v. British Columbia (Forest 
Appeals Commission), [2003] 2 S.C.R. 585, [2003] S.C.J. No. 34 [hereinafter “Paul”]; R. v. 
Blais, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 236, [2003] S.C.J. No. 44 [hereinafter “Blais”]; R. v. Buhay, [2003] 1 
S.C.R. 631, [2003] S.C.J. No. 30 [hereinafter “Buhay”]; R. v. Clay, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 735, 
[2003] S.C.J. No. 80 [hereinafter “Clay”]; R v. Johnson, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 357, [2003] S.C.J. 
No. 45 [hereinafter “Johnson”]; R. v. Edgar, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 388, [2003] S.C.J. No. 46 
[hereinafter “Edgar”]; R. v. Kelly, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 400, [2003] S.C.J. No. 49 [hereinafter 
“Kelly”]; R. v. Mitchell, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 396, [2003] S.C.J. No. 48 [hereinafter “Mitchell”]; R. 
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previous years, the majority (17 out of 24) of the constitutional deci-
sions in 2003 were Charter cases. Two cases dealt with Aboriginal 
rights issues, two with Bill of Rights issues, and four with federalism 
issues. 
I. CHARTER CASES 
The McLachlin Court continues to be extremely receptive to Charter 
claims. In 2003, the increase in the success rate of Charter cases seen 
throughout the McLachlin Court continued, with 11 of 17 (or 65 per 
cent) of the Charter claims heard succeeding. Since McLachlin J. be-
came Chief Justice on January 7, 2000, 33 out of a total 62 (52 per cent) 
Charter claims have succeeded. This represents a marked increase from 
the success rate of 34 per cent (31 out of 90 cases) seen between 1996 
and 1999, and the 32 per cent success rate (86 out of 264 cases) seen in 
the 1991-1995 period. 
1. Remedial Powers (Section 24(1)) 
Doucet-Boudreau, the case Osgoode Hall Law School’s Constitu-
tional Advisory Board4 identified as the most significant decision of 
2003, affirmed the power of superior courts to supervise the implemen-
tation of judicial orders issued under section 24(1). There, after finding 
that Nova Scotia had violated minority language rights, the trial judge 
                                                                                                                                
v. Smith, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 392, [2003] S.C.J. No. 47 [hereinafter “Smith”]; R. v. Malmo-
Levine; R. v. Caine, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79 [hereinafter “Malmo-Levine”]; 
R. v. Powley, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 207, [2003] S.C.J. No. 43 [hereinafter “Powley”]; R. v. S.A.B., 
[2003] 2 S.C.R. 678, [2003] S.C.J. No. 61 [hereinafter “S.A.B.”]; R. v. Taillefer; R. v. 
Duguay, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 307, [2003] S.C.J. No. 75 [hereinafter “Taillefer”]; Trociuk v. 
British Columbia (Attorney General), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 835, [2003] S.C.J. No. 32 [hereinafter 
“Trociuk”]; Unifund Assurance Co. v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 
63, [2003] S.C.J. No. 39 [hereinafter “Unifund Assurance”]; Vann Niagara Ltd. v. Oakville 
(Town), [2003] 3 S.C.R. 158, [2003] S.C.J. No. 71 [hereinafter “Vann Niagara”]. In addition 
to these cases, the Court also released its decision in Authorson v. Canada (Attorney Gen-
eral), [2003] 2 S.C.R. 40, [2003] S.C.J. No. 40 [hereinafter “Authorson”]. Although this 
decision does not consider a constitutional provision, it is quasi-constitutional in nature 
because of its consideration of the Canadian Bill of Rights (R.S.C. 1985, Appendix III). 
4
 Osgoode Hall Law School’s Constitutional Advisory Board (the Advisory Board) 
consists of 43 of the leading academics, practitioners and government lawyers from across 
Canada. 
(2004), 24 S.C.L.R. (2d) Constitutional Cases 2003 3 
 
ordered the province to establish French-language programs in various 
school districts by specified dates, and to use its “best efforts” to meet a 
judicially imposed schedule. This part of the trial judge’s order was not 
appealed by the province. However, Nova Scotia did appeal the further 
order requiring the province to submit ongoing compliance reports, on 
grounds that this raised unprecedented questions about the separation of 
powers and the institutional authority of the courts to enforce their 
judgments against the other branches of government.  
The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal allowed the province’s appeal and 
overturned the portion of the trial judge’s order requiring compliance 
reports. In his majority opinion, Flinn J.A. stated that the Charter does 
not give courts the authority to ensure that governments comply with 
their orders, and questioned the necessity of the trial judge’s reporting 
order, as there was no evidence that the government did not intend to 
comply with the order.  
By a 5-4 margin the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and 
reinstated the trial judge’s order in its entirety. Justices Iacobucci and 
Arbour wrote a joint opinion for the majority which concluded that the 
reporting requirement was within the court’s jurisdiction to order reme-
dies that are flexible and responsive to the needs of the particular case. 
In finding that ongoing supervision was an appropriate remedy in 
Doucet-Boudreau, they proposed a four-part test to define the scope of 
section 24 remedies: the first step asks whether the remedy meaning-
fully vindicates the rights and freedoms of the claimants; the second 
considers whether legitimate means are employed within the framework 
of constitutional democracy; the third assesses whether the remedy 
vindicates the right while invoking the court’s function and powers; and 
the fourth determines whether the remedy is fair to the party against 
whom the order is made, once having ensured that the right of the 
claimant is fully vindicated.  
Doucet-Boudreau’s test creates several problems. For instance, Ia-
cobucci and Arbour JJ.’s application of its criteria appears to be result-
oriented and is driven by their desire to force the government to comply 
with the trial judge’s order. As Flinn J.A. noted, there was no evidence 
that the government would not have complied without the reporting 
order. Further, the test fails to identify what limits, if any, exist in rela-
tion to judicial remedies under section 24(1). There were no special or 
exceptional circumstances that warranted ongoing judicial supervision 
in this case, other than the concern over whether the government would 
4  Supreme Court Law Review (2004), 24 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
in fact comply with the order in a timely way. Thus, in any future case 
in which a court is concerned as to whether the government will comply 
with an order, it will be open to the court to order ongoing compliance 
hearings such as were required in Doucet-Boudreau.  
The dissenting opinion written by LeBel and Deschamps JJ. would 
have upheld the Court of Appeal’s decision to overturn the reporting 
order. They concluded that the trial judge’s failure to define the purpose 
of the compliance hearings violated the requirement of procedural fair-
ness. In addition, the order violated the constitutional separation of 
powers by allowing the judiciary to supervise the executive. Further, by 
purporting to put pressure on the government to enhance minority lan-
guage education, which is a political rather than a judicial function, the 
order violated the functus officio doctrine. 
Several articles in the forthcoming volume 25 discuss the Court’s 
decision in Doucet-Boudreau. Marilyn Pilkington,5 Debra McAllister6 
and Kent Roach7 regard the decision to expand the judiciary’s remedial 
powers under section 24(1) as a positive development. McAllister ar-
gues that the Canadian traditions of judicial restraint and mutual defer-
ence by courts and legislatures allow courts to issue structural 
injunctions without the political conflict that arose when the U.S. Su-
preme Court ordered similar remedies.  
Marilyn Pilkington notes that the Court unanimously affirmed the 
availability of supervisory remedies, and that what separated the major-
ity and minority opinions was a disagreement about whether supervisory 
remedies should be available as a matter of last resort or should consti-
tute one of several options to remedy constitutional infringements. Pilk-
ington and McAllister both express concerns about the restrictions 
Doucet-Boudreau places on statutory courts and administrative tribu-
nals’ authority to issue remedial orders. McAllister worries that despite 
substantial developments, a cohesive set of principles which would 
ensure a remedy for those whose rights have been infringed has not 
evolved. She points to gaps in the law, especially for the statutory courts 
                                                                                                                                
5
  “Enforcing the Charter: The Supervisory Role of Superior Courts and the Responsi-
bility of Legislatures for Remedial Systems” (2004), 25 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) (forthcoming). 
6
  “Charter Remedies and Jurisdiction to Grant Them: The Evolution of Section 24(1) 
and Section 52(1)” (2004) 25 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) (forthcoming). 
7
  “Principled Remedial Discretion under the Charter” (2004) 25 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 
(forthcoming). 
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and administrative tribunals that lack the authority to grant a remedy. 
Her conclusion that the legislatures must take up the issue is supported 
by Pilkington, who argues that Parliament and the legislatures have a 
constitutional responsibility to review and amend statutory jurisdiction 
and procedure to give effect to section 24’s broad remedial jurisdictions.  
Kent Roach explores the requirements for a principled approach to 
remedial decision-making by analyzing the Court’s split decisions in 
Doucet-Boudreau and British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Okana-
gan Indian Band.8 He suggests that principled remedial discretion 
requires a judge to apply general principles, including the need for ef-
fective remedies and respect for institutional role, to the context of a 
particular violation. To explain what he means, Roach compares that 
approach to two other forms of remedial decision-making which he 
describes as strong discretion and rule-based discretion. He concludes 
that Doucet-Boudreau marks a positive development, because members 
of the Court agreed on the relevant principles and provided a principled 
framework for the future, despite not agreeing how those principles 
should apply in that case. By contrast, he is more troubled by Okanagan 
Indian Band’s failure to agree on the principles that should inform the 
judge’s discretion to award interim or advance costs.  
Meanwhile, Allan Hutchinson declines to side with those who 
view the majority decision in Doucet-Boudreau as blatant and unwel-
come judicial activism, or with others who applaud the Court for over-
coming the pusillanimity of some of its members and providing 
meaningful protection for constitutional rights as a result.9 Instead he 
proposes an alternative viewpoint: that whether activist or restrained, 
the judges are involved in an inevitably and thoroughly political exer-
cise. Hutchinson maintains that efforts to separate law from politics 
are doomed to failure.  
                                                                                                                                
8
  2003 SCC 71, [2003] S.C.J. No. 76 (December 12, 2003). This case deals with a 
court’s power to make interim costs orders and was not a constitutional case. 
9
  “Judges and Politics: An Essay from Canada” (2004) 25 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) (forth-
coming). 
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2. Legal Rights (Sections 7 and 8 of the Charter) 
The trilogy of marijuana cases (Malmo-Levine, Caine and Clay), 
which upheld the Narcotic Control Act’s prohibition on marijuana 
possession and use, was selected by the Advisory Board as the third 
most significant constitutional decision of 2003.10 Though the posses-
sion offence was also challenged under the division of powers and 
section 15(1) of the Charter, the Court’s opinions in these cases fo-
cused on section 7.11 Specifically, the question was whether fundamen-
tal justice includes a “harm principle” that limits the government’s 
power to criminalize “unharmful behaviour”.12 By a vote of 6-3, the 
Court held that the Parliament is not constrained by a constitutional 
concept of harm in deciding what conduct should be criminalized. The 
majority opinion also concluded that the drug offences were not arbi-
trary or irrational, in the constitutional sense, and that the availability 
of a prison sentence did not render them grossly disproportionate un-
der section 7 or section 12 of the Charter.  
Three members of the Court dissented. Justice Arbour alone held 
that harm is a constitutionally required component of any offence pun-
ishable by imprisonment. In her view, the social harms of marijuana use 
are not sufficient to justify the potential punishment of imprisonment. 
Justices LeBel and Deschamps also concluded, in separate dissenting 
reasons, that the offence was unconstitutional because the penalty of 
imprisonment and the measures used to enforce the law on possession 
are “disproportionate” to the societal problem of marijuana use. Their 
position on this issue is somewhat surprising, given that their dissent in 
Doucet-Boudreau stressed that the judiciary should not intrude on the 
policy-making function of the legislature. A judgment as to whether the 
penalty for marijuana possession is disproportionate to the societal prob-
lem posed by marijuana possession seems a quintessentially legislative 
                                                                                                                                
10
  The second most significant constitutional decision was Powley. It is discussed in the 
Aboriginal rights section below. 
11
  The provisions challenged in Malmo-Levine were: Narcotic Control Act, R.S.C. 
1985, c. N-1, ss. 3(1), 4(2) [Act repealed, S.C. 1996 c. 19, s. 94, effective May 14, 1997]. 
Clay was a challenge to s. 3(1) of the Narcotic Control Act. 
12
  The harm principle, adapted from John Mill’s On Liberty, would require that for an 
activity to be criminalized, it must cause harm to other individuals or present a serious risk of 
harm. 
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judgment that might have been thought to fall outside the bounds of the 
judicial role. 
Early in 2004, the Court upheld section 43 of the Criminal Code, 
which allows parents and teachers to use physical force to discipline 
children.13 Chief Justice McLachlin wrote the majority opinion, which 
held under section 7 that the provision adversely affects children’s secu-
rity of the person, but does not offend a principle of fundamental justice. 
She concluded that, when properly construed, section 43 is not unduly 
vague or overbroad, because it sets real boundaries and delineates a risk 
zone for criminal sanction. She then proceeded to articulate the bounda-
ries on its application that would prevent discretionary law enforcement 
from occurring under section 43. Justice Arbour dissented on the ground 
that the provision violates the rights of children and is unconstitutionally 
vague. Justice Binnie’s partial dissent focused on the section 15 claim, 
which is discussed below, as did that of Deschamps J.  
Roslyn Levine14 and Paul Burstein’s15 articles consider the status of 
the harm principle as an aspect of fundamental justice under section 7 in 
light of these decisions. Levine endorses the Court’s decision to reject 
the harm principle, because in her view it is necessary to balance indi-
vidual liberty rights and state interests to determine what fundamental 
justice requires. The difficulty for her is that such a principle would 
permanently predispose the section 7 balance in favour of the individ-
ual’s interest and in doing so significantly change the content of the 
guarantee. Even so, Levine warns that the principle influences the 
Court’s perception of the types of arbitrariness, irrationality, and gross 
disproportionality that are inconsistent with section 7’s principles of 
fundamental justice. Accordingly, she concludes that the marijuana 
cases are not conclusive, and that discussions about the harm principle 
will continue for a long time.  
Despite participating as counsel in cases that challenged the mari-
juana laws, Paul Burstein admits that the absence of a harm principle in 
                                                                                                                                
13
  Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney Gen-
eral) 2004 SCC 4, [2004] S.C.J. No. 6 [hereinafter “Canadian Foundation”]. Although this 
case was not decided in 2003, it is discussed in several articles in this volume.  
14
  “In Harm’s Way: The Limits to Legislating Criminal Law” (2004), of this volume, at 
195. 
15
  “What’s the Harm in Having a ‘Harm Principle’ Enshrined in Section 7 of the Char-
ter?” (2004), of this volume, at 159. 
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the section 7 jurisprudence may not be such a bad idea after all. The 
source of this revelation, in Burstein’s case, is the Court’s subsequent 
decision in Canadian Foundation. That is when he saw that the concept 
can cut both ways: a constitutionally entrenched harm principle might 
invalidate the marijauna laws but could also compel the criminalization 
of conduct Parliament had otherwise decriminalized. Even so, Burstein 
is critical of the marijuana trilogy for narrowing the scope of judicial 
review of the criminal law. He argues that these cases, which allow 
Parliament to criminalize anything that may cause non-trivial harm to 
the actor or to society, will make it more difficult to challenge over-
reaching and unnecessary criminal provisions in the future. 
In commenting on the marijuana trilogy, Janine Benedet asks 
whether the gross disproportionality standard may still operate in a 
fashion akin to the principle of de minimis non curat lex, and states that 
Malmo-Levine may represent an implicit recognition that de minimis is a 
principle of fundamental justice and thus a valid common law defence. 
More generally, she notes that the real issue is one of institutional com-
petence: a question of determining who, as between Parliament and the 
courts, is better placed to judge the question of harm. In her paper, she 
notes a contradiction between the majority decisions in the marijuana 
trilogy and Canadian Foundation: though the Court permitted Parlia-
ment to criminalize any conduct that poses a risk of harm that is more 
than trivial in the marijuana trilogy, it refused to review Parliament’s 
decision to shield individuals from criminal liability for causing harm to 
children in Canadian Foundation. 
The legal rights protected by sections 8 to 14 did not play as promi-
nent a role in this year’s constitutional cases, and were overshadowed by 
section 7’s marijuana trilogy and the Court’s section 43 decision in early 
2004.16 In that regard, it should be noted that the Court has heard argu-
ment in an important case from Manitoba, and that its decision in R. v. 
Mann is under reserve.17 Mann raises the question whether the police 
have the power to detain and search a person, despite not having 
grounds for arrest. The further issue before the Court is whether this 
power must be authorized by statute, to comply with the Charter, or can 
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  But see Buhay, supra, note 3. 
17
  (2002), 169 C.C.C. (3d) 272, [2002] M.J. No. 380 (C.A.). 
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be grounded in the common law and constrained on a case by case basis 
through the evolution of judicial doctrine. 
In addition, anticipation swells around two other cases that have 
now been heard, which test the Court’s willingness to review social and 
health care policies under sections 7 and 15 of the Charter. Auton v. 
British Columbia is mainly a section 15 case, and will be discussed 
briefly in the next section of the overview.18 In Chaoulli v. Quebec, the 
claimants rely on section 7 of the Charter in an effort to be free of the 
province’s mandatory health care scheme, which prohibits individuals 
from seeking access to services on a private basis which are publicly 
funded.19 Chaoulli raises the question of whether such restrictions on the 
use of private resources to access needed health care services can be 
justified when such services are not available in a timely way through 
the public system.20 Quebec strenuously defended the right of govern-
ments to structure the health care system as a matter of social policy, on 
the ground that Chaoulli’s claim did not implicate the “administration of 
justice” and could not give rise to a section 7 claim.21 Certainly this case 
will provide an important indication of the Court’s willingness to deal 
with a contentious and highly charged matter of social policy.  
3. Equality Rights (Section 15) 
The Court heard three major cases under section 15 in 2003; the 
claim succeeded twice, in Trociuk v. British Columbia and Martin v. 
                                                                                                                                
18
  Auton (Guardian ad Litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney General) (2002), 220 
D.L.R. (4th) 411, [2002] B.C.J. No. 2258 (C.A.). 
19
  The claimants argue that restrictions on access to private health care services can 
only be constitutionally justified if such services are available in a timely way through the 
public system. Chaoulli c. Québec (Procureur general), [2002] R.J.Q. 1205 (Que. C.A.), 
leave to appeal to S.C.C. allowed (2003), 319 N.R. 198 (note), 2003 Carswell Que 850 (May 
8, 2003). The claimants argue that restrictions on access to private health care services can 
only be constitutionally justified if such services are available in a timely way through the 
public system. 
20
  We disclose that Patrick Monahan acted as counsel for intervenors in the case who 
sought a ruling that the legislation in question is invalid in the absence of some form of legal 
guarantee of timely access to health care services.  
21
  The Court left this issue open in Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] 4 
S.C.R. 429, [2002] S.C.J. No. 85. For a discussion, see J. Cameron, “Positive Obligations 
under Sections 15 and 7 of the Charter: A Comment on Gosselin v. Quebec” (2003) 20 Sup. 
Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 65. 
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Nova Scotia, before failing in Canadian Foundation, which was decided 
in January of 2004. The complexity and unpredictability of the Court’s 
section 15 test in Law v. Canada has been criticized in recent years.22 
From that perspective, it is noteworthy that its decisions in Trociuk and 
Martin were unanimous. By contrast, the division of opinion that 
emerged in Canadian Foundation reveals that the section 15 analysis 
continues to generate disagreement among members of the Court. 
In Trociuk, the Court invalidated provisions of British Columbia’s 
Vital Statistics Act,23 which allowed the permanent exclusion of a fa-
ther’s particulars from the birth registration record if a mother chose, for 
any reason, not to acknowledge his status as the child’s father. The 
Court dismissed the argument that the claim was weak because fathers 
do not belong to an “historically disadvantaged group”. In doing so, 
Deschamps J. emphasized that no single element in the Law test is de-
terminative of the dignity issue. Though fathers could justifiably be 
excluded in certain circumstances, the birth registration scheme was 
flawed because it permitted them to be arbitrarily excluded. Not only 
did that subject all unacknowledged fathers to a negative attribution 
similar to a stereotype, it failed to impair their rights as little as reasona-
bly possible. 
Then the Court held in Martin that a scheme denying benefits to 
workers who suffered from chronic pain was unconstitutional. 24 Though 
all workers covered by the program suffer a disability, Gonthier J. con-
cluded that treating workers with chronic pain differently from those 
without such pain is a disability-based distinction under section 15. It 
was unnecessary to determine whether chronic pain workers have suf-
fered a history of disadvantage, because the program could not satisfy 
the Law test’s requirement that the different treatment correspond to 
their needs and circumstances. Under section 1 the problem in Martin 
was the same as in Trociuk: the blanket exclusion of chronic pain from 
the compensation scheme did not minimally impair the rights of those 
workers. That conclusion also made it unnecessary for the Court to 
                                                                                                                                
22
  Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, 
[1999] S.C.J. No. 12. 
23
  R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 479, ss. 3(1)(b), 3(6)(b) [am. S.B.C. 2002, c. 74, s. 3). 
24
  The impugned statute and regulations are: Workers’ Compensation Act, S.N.S. 1994-
95, c. 10, s. 10B, Functional Restoration (Multi-Faceted Pain Services) Program Regula-
tions, N.S. Reg. 57/96. 
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decide whether fiscal considerations, and the cost of providing benefits, 
could ever be considered a pressing and substantial objective.   
As noted above, Canadian Foundation was also decided under sec-
tion 15(1). On that part of the claim, the majority held that the provision 
did not violate equality because a reasonable person, acting on behalf of 
a child, would not conclude that the child’s dignity would be offended 
by forcible correction. Justice Binnie disagreed with that analysis, on the 
grounds that denying them the Charter’s protection turns children into 
second class citizens, and in methodological terms imports a section 1 
analysis into the guarantee. While Binnie J. upheld section 43 under 
section 1, Deschamps J. found a breach of section 15 which was not 
justifiable.  
This year’s commentators have drawn a variety of observations and 
conclusions from these cases. Once again, the Court’s overall approach 
to equality claims has come under criticism. Geoffrey Cowper explains 
that the Court is holding to the Law test, though the test does not pro-
vide a formulaic answer which will satisfy all concerned. He observes 
that the meaning and relative importance of the test’s contextual ele-
ments remain open to interpretation as a result. For instance, while of-
fending human dignity compendiously describes the conclusion without 
advancing the analysis, the concept of a reasonable claimant allows 
either a subjective or objective perspective to dominate. His view of 
Trociuk is that the application of section 15 to a relatively unnoticed 
indignity addresses an aspect of justice that is more symbolic than real. 
Colleen Sheppard’s comment on Trociuk makes a similar point a 
different way, by comparing the reasoning of the lower courts with that 
of the Supreme Court, to illustrate “the indeterminacy of the current test 
of constitutional discrimination”. She points up the uncertainty of decid-
ing how a reasonable claimant who has been subject to different treat-
ment might be expected to respond. Her analysis of Martin leads her to 
add that “the very nebulous overarching criterion of human dignity, 
assessed from the perspective of the reasonable claimant, does not ap-
pear to provide significant certainty in predicting outcomes”.  
With particular reference to Martin, Robert Charney and Daniel 
Guttman focus attention on the place of financial considerations in the 
12  Supreme Court Law Review (2004), 24 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
justification analysis under section 1.25 In doing so, they maintain that 
the courts cannot ignore the fiscal implications of their decisions and the 
limitations under which governments operate in administering social 
and health care programs. They raise the critical question whether there 
are institutional boundaries on the judiciary’s authority to intervene in 
the policy domain.  
Janine Benedet states that Canadian Foundation deals a blow to his-
torically subordinated groups seeking to use the right to equality to 
expose their experiences of state-sanctioned and socially accepted vio-
lence. She argues that the first and most obvious problem with the Law 
test is its focus on dignity as a proxy for equality. Pointedly, she asks 
why the Court cannot address questions of discrimination and equality 
in direct terms. Benedet and Sheppard both argue that the human dignity 
focus and the four contextual factors used to assess whether this re-
quirement is met do not provide an appropriate basis for evaluating 
equality rights claims. Benedet argues that the human dignity element 
penalizes claimants who are able to maintain their dignity in the face of 
oppression. Sheppard concludes that the Court should move from its 
present substantive equality approach to a new inclusive equality focus.  
In addition to commenting on the 2003 cases, Bruce Ryder, Codalia 
Faria and Emily Lawrence have surveyed the section 15 cases decided 
since 1989,26 when the Court adopted a substantive equality approach to 
section 15 in Law Society of British Columbia v. Andrews.27 Contrary to 
the view, sometimes expressed, that the Court favours equality-seeking 
groups, they find that section 15’s success rate of 27.9 per cent is lower 
than the average success rate of all Charter claims, which is about 35 per 
cent. They also indicate that the success rate is higher under the Law test 
than it was under Andrews, thus disproving the contention that Law’s 
criteria have disadvantaged claimants. Even so, the authors are critical 
of the Court’s application of the correspondence test, which considers 
the relationship between the grounds of discrimination at issue and the 
actual needs, capacities and circumstances of the claimant. As they 
explain, the claimants succeeded in Trociuk and Martin because the 
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requisite correspondence was lacking, but not in Canadian Foundation 
because the Court concluded that age corresponds to the need for physi-
cal correction.28 After discussing the status of formal and substantive 
understandings of equality under Law, the authors propose revisions to 
the test which would promote substantive equality.  
In Auton, which was mentioned above, the Court will face a huge 
test in deciding whether it is discriminatory for the Province of B.C. not 
to fund the special care needs of autistic children. The Court cannot 
uphold the appellate court’s decision that the claimants are entitled to 
treatment under section 15 without imposing an obligation on the prov-
ince to meet their needs, and intruding on the government’s prerogative 
to decide whether, when and for whose benefit scarce resources will be 
allocated. Although it appears that the section 1 analysis may be crucial, 
the Court’s tendency to disagree in applying Law means that the section 
15 discussion will also form an important part of the analysis in Auton.  
4. Fundamental Freedoms and the Right to Vote (Sections 2(b) and 
3 of the Charter) 
The Supreme Court decided Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney Gen-
eral), a key case under section 3 of the Charter, in 2003. Though there 
were no important decisions on freedom of expression last year,29 
Harper v. Canada (Attorney General) is the most important section 2(b) 
case to arise in years. The Court’s decision was released in May of 
2004, days before a federal election was called.30 Though Harper will 
be featured in next year’s publication, the point for now is that Figueroa 
and Harper both address rights of democratic participation, and should 
be read together for that reason. 
In Figueroa the Court relied on the right to vote that is guaranteed 
by section 3 of the Charter to invalidate provisions of the Canada Elec-
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tions Act,31 which made certain benefits and entitlements available only 
to political parties that fielded 50 candidates in an election. Those that 
did not cross that threshold could not be registered and were not eligible 
to issue tax receipts, to transfer unused election funds to the party, or to 
have party affiliation listed beside the candidate’s name on the ballot. 
Curiously, the Court’s majority opinion did not find the candidate 
minimum unconstitutional because it violated the rights of political 
parties, but because provisions withholding benefits from certain parties 
undermined the right of each citizen to meaningful participation in the 
election process. Writing for a 6-3 majority, Iacobucci J. held that the 50 
candidate rule disadvantaged small parties in ways that would deny 
citizens’ access to their ideas, and thus infringed their right, as voters, to 
play a meaningful role in the electoral process.  
Despite agreeing with the disposition of the case, LeBel J. wrote 
separately to express his reservations about the majority opinion’s 
methodology. In particular, he rejected an individualistic approach to 
the guarantee and maintained that communitarian aspects should influ-
ence the definition of the right. Though he agreed in the result, LeBel J. 
only did so only after balancing competing values within section 3. His 
approach was narrower than that of Iacobucci J., who articulated a right 
of meaningful participation that could have far-reaching consequences. 
To give one example, Figueroa’s endorsement of a voter’s right to a 
certain level of participation in the electoral process should mean that 
the first-past-the-post electoral system violates section 3.32 This system 
has an even greater impact on the ability of small parties to introduce 
ideas into political debate than the 50 candidate threshold struck down 
in Figueroa. The outcome of a constitutional challenge to the first-past-
the-post system will turn on the Court’s assessment of how the various 
interests at stake should be balanced. 
Danielle Pinard’s article questions the Court’s reliance on the dis-
tinction between section 3’s literal words, which guarantee the right to 
vote, and its non-literal content, which includes the right to effective 
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representation.33 In her view, it is not useful to draw distinctions be-
tween the literal and non-literal infringement of rights. She describes 
Figueroa as an exercise in abstract reasoning, and notes that although 
one might have expected to find information about the kinds of parties 
or ideologies that were excluded by the statutory advantages, the Court 
was less interested in empirical realities than in providing a political 
philosophy discourse. 
Harper v. Canada raised the question whether federal legislation 
that places a $3,000 limit on third party spending during a federal elec-
tion violates section 2(b) of the Charter.34 In Figueroa, the Court stated 
that each citizen must have a genuine opportunity to take part in the 
governance of the country through the selection of elected representa-
tives.35 Strict spending limits have a far greater impact on meaningful 
participation than the 50 candidate rule: such restrictions grant the po-
litical parties a monopoly on debate during an election campaign and, in 
doing so, effectively silence the voices of citizens. Over a strong dissent 
by McLachlin C.J. and Major J., Bastarache J. upheld the Canada Elec-
tion Act’s restrictions on third party advertising in Harper v. Canada 
(Attorney General).36  
His majority opinion made three key points. First, he stated that the 
$3,000 maximum promoted an electoral process that is egalitarian in 
nature. Second, and despite acknowledging that the election advertising 
of third parties lies at the core of section 2(b), he claimed that the Court 
should defer to the legislature on this issue. Deference led to the third 
feature of his analysis, which permitted Parliament to prohibit expres-
sive activity that is not harmful. 
Not surprisingly, the dissent relied heavily on Figueroa and the im-
portance of guaranteeing an equal voice to each citizen. Chief Justice 
McLachlin and Major J. stressed that the legislation set the spending 
limits at such a low level that third parties cannot effectively communi-
cate with fellow citizens during an election. The practical effect is that 
communication during an election is confined to registered political 
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parties and their candidates. They found the limit unconstitutional be-
cause there is a serious disproportion between the gravity of the danger 
arising from campaign spending, which the dissenters described as un-
proven, speculative and wholly hypothetical, and the severity of the 
threat to expressive freedom, which they regarded as draconian in na-
ture. 
5. Tribunals’ Jurisdiction to Apply the Charter 
In Martin, the Court clarified and simplified the rules that are to be 
applied to determine whether an administrative tribunal has jurisdiction 
to apply the Charter. This approach overrules the test laid out in Bell v. 
Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission); Cooper v. Canada 
(Human Rights Commission).37 The central question posed under the 
Martin approach is whether the tribunal is explicitly or implicitly given 
jurisdiction to decide questions of law arising under the provision that is 
the subject of the Charter challenge. Explicit jurisdiction is found in the 
tribunal’s statutory grant of authority, while implicit jurisdiction is dis-
cerned by looking at the authorizing statute as a whole. It is important to 
note that if the tribunal has jurisdiction to decide questions of law aris-
ing from the provision, it is presumed to have jurisdiction to apply the 
Charter. This presumption may be rebutted by the party alleging that the 
tribunal does not have jurisdiction by pointing to a statutory provision 
explicitly withdrawing the tribunal’s authority to consider the Charter. 
The party may also convince the court that an examination of the statu-
tory scheme leads to the conclusion that the drafters of the legislation 
intended to exclude the tribunal from considering the Charter. Charney 
and Guttman38 argue that the decisions reached in Martin and Paul 
indicate that governments must explicitly exclude tribunals from con-
sidering the Charter if they do not want a wide range of government 
activity to be subject to review. 
Peter Hogg argues that the decisions reached in Martin and Paul39 
do not represent new developments in jurisprudence on tribunals’ juris-
diction to apply the Charter; rather, they restate the position reached by 
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the Court in earlier cases.40 Hogg agrees that tribunals should have the 
jurisdiction to issue remedies and that individuals whose Charter rights 
have been infringed should be able to access remedies at the most con-
venient forum. However, Hogg cautions that some tribunals are not 
well-suited to issuing remedies due to the nature of their expertise or 
caseload. He argues that amendments to these tribunals’ authorizing 
statutes should be passed to explicitly exclude them from considering 
the Charter. 
6.  Bill of Rights 
The Court issued decisions in two cases, Authorson and Bell Can-
ada, that raised issues related to the Canadian Bill of Rights.41 Although 
both claims failed, they confirm the continuing relevance of section 2(e) 
of the Bill of Rights, the provision that establishes the right to a fair 
hearing in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. 
In Authorson, the Court held that section 2(e) was not violated by 
the federal government’s failure to pay interest on the pensions it ad-
ministered for disabled veterans, since section 2(e) is limited to proce-
dural rights, and there are no special procedural rights that apply to the 
enactment of legislation. In addition, the Court held that the due process 
protection afforded by section 1(a) of the Bill of Rights does not include 
a substantive procedural guarantee in respect of the expropriation of 
property. However, Major J. for the Court did leave open the possibility 
that in appropriate circumstances (other than in respect of a property-
based claim), the guarantee of due process in section 1(a) can include a 
substantive component. On the other hand, given that the Court has 
already determined that the “principles of fundamental justice” in sec-
tion 7 of the Charter include a substantive component, it remains unclear 
whether section 1(a) of the Bill of Rights will add anything beyond the 
substantive protections already included in section 7. 
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The Court held unanimously in Bell Canada that provisions in the 
Canadian Human Rights Act42 allowing the Human Rights Commission 
to issue guidelines binding on the Human Rights Tribunal and to extend 
judges’ terms to allow them to finish hearing a claim do not violate 
section 2(e). Chief Justice McLachlin and Bastarache J. held that guide-
lines issued by the Human Rights Commission are a form of law. As 
such, the tribunal’s independence is not unduly restricted by being 
forced to apply the guidelines. Further, the power to extend members’ 
appointments does not undermine the independence or impartiality of 
the tribunal. 
The 2003 Bill of Rights decisions are explored by Lorne Sossin in 
his article, “The Quasi-Revival of the Canadian Bill of Rights and its 
Implications for Administrative Law”.43 Sossin is critical of the Court’s 
rulings in Authorson and Bell Canada for treating the Bill of Rights as 
merely entrenching existing common law standards. In Authorson, Ma-
jor J. stated that the Bill of Rights guarantees only those rights that were 
in existence at the time the Bill of Rights was enacted. Sossin argues that 
it is incorrect to interpret the Bill of Rights, a quasi-constitutional docu-
ment, as protecting only the “embryonic” fair hearing and due process 
protections that existed at the time of its enactment. Further, he criti-
cizes the Court for finding it unnecessary to consider section 2(e) of the 
Bill of Rights in Bell Canada because the common law standards of 
independence and impartiality had been satisfied. Sossin concludes that 
the Bill of Rights is likely to play an increasing scope in Canadian juris-
prudence, a development that he regards as positive. However, he ar-
gues that for the Bill of Rights to be interpreted appropriately, the courts 
must develop a more sophisticated understanding of its relationship to 
the common law.  
7. Administrative Law and the Reasonable Apprehension of Bias 
Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada did not arise under the division 
of powers or the Charter of Rights. Wewaykum No. 1 concerned two 
Indian Bands in British Columbia, each of which claimed the other’s 
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reserve land, and each of which alleged a breach of fiduciary duty 
against the federal Crown.44 Wewaykum No. 2 was an attempt to vacate 
the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in No. 1, on the ground that 
there was a reasonable apprehension of bias that the participation of 
Binnie J., who wrote the majority opinion, was compromised.45 The 
suggestion of bias was based on information, which emerged after the 
Court rendered its decision, that Mr. Justice Binnie had contact with the 
issues at stake in the litigation when he served as Associate Deputy 
Minister of Justice, in 1985 and 1986. In concluding that there was no 
reasonable apprehension of bias, the Court emphasized that Binnie J. 
had not been counsel in the case, that the passage of time between his 
contact with the file as a government lawyer and his contact as a judge 
had been at least 15 years, that he did not recall the particulars after that 
lapse of time, and that the Supreme Court’s decision making process 
comprised nine judges and not a single decision maker. 
Adam Dodek’s paper contends that Wewaykum No. 2 is not only an 
administrative law decision, but one which implicates constitutional 
principles as well.46 He maintains that judicial impartiality is an impor-
tant core value in our constitutional system and suggests that Parlia-
ment, the bar, and the Court itself have duties to protect the integrity of 
the Supreme Court of Canada. While Parliament should codify the cir-
cumstances and procedures for disqualification, the Court should direct 
counsel to deal with recusal issues at the time of the hearing, rather than 
after the fact, and members of the bar should be required to act with due 
diligence on questions of disqualification. 
II. ABORIGINAL RIGHTS 
Two Aboriginal rights claims, Blais and Powley were heard by the 
Court in 2003, with the claim in Powley succeeding. Powley, which sets 
out the framework for identifying Métis rights under section 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, was selected by the Advisory Board as the sec-
ond most significant constitutional decision of 2003. There are two 
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important elements to this decision. The first is the definition of “Métis” 
identified by the Court. Because section 35 does not define the term 
“Métis”, the Court was required to determine who may qualify as a 
potential claimant under section 35. The Court concluded that not all 
persons of mixed European and Aboriginal heritage qualify as Métis. 
Rather, the Métis must be a distinctive people or community living 
together in the same geographic area and sharing a common way of life. 
There must also be continuity and stability over time in the community. 
Verification of a claimant’s membership in the Métis community is to 
be based on the individual’s self-identification, ancestral connection and 
acceptance in the community. This test is vague and will certainly re-
quire refinement through future litigation. However, it is important to 
note that by failing to include any definition of “Métis” in section 35, 
the drafters of the Constitution Act, 1982 assigned the courts a daunting, 
quasi-legislative task. In our view Powley represents an important first 
step in fashioning a meaningful yet flexible definition to the term Métis.  
The second important element of Powley is that it modifies the pre-
contact test for Aboriginal rights established in R. v. Van der Peet47 to 
accommodate Métis claims. The Court held that Métis rights protected 
by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 must be established with 
reference to the date of “effective control” by Europeans, rather than 
that of first European contact. Section 35 is held to protect those prac-
tices, customs and traditions that existed when Europeans effectively 
established political and legal control in the particular area. It is not 
clear whether “effective control” differs from the date of assertion of 
sovereignty, the latter being the date relied on in Delgamuukw for de-
termining claims of Aboriginal title. In short, there now appear to be 
three distinct points in time that may be relevant for assessing Aborigi-
nal claims under section 35: the date of contact for Aboriginal rights 
generally (Van der Peet); the date of “effective control” for claims of 
Métis rights (Powley); and the date of assertion of European sovereignty 
for claims of Aboriginal title (Delgamuukw). Applying these distinc-
tions in future cases will raise difficult historical questions, and may 
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lead to inconsistent or arbitrary results, which may well cause the Court 
to attempt to consolidate or simplify these rules. 
There are three articles in this volume examining the implications of 
the Powley decision. All agree that Powley is the first step in a long road 
toward developing a comprehensive framework for Métis rights. Lori 
Sterling and Peter Lemmond’s paper, “R. v. Powley: Building a Founda-
tion for the Constitutional Recognition of Métis Aboriginal Rights”, 
identifies several issues that the case failed to resolve.48 In particular, 
they observe that some Aboriginal groups will be able to rely alterna-
tively on the Van der Peet and Powley tests, thus leaving open the pos-
sibility that the “point of contact” test in Van der Peet may not survive. 
Because the benchmark date chosen in Powley will allow greater asser-
tion of commercial rights, Aboriginal groups are likely to seek the ap-
plication of the Powley test to their community. Sterling and Lemmond 
also contend that the Court provided too little reasoning on why the date 
of effective European control was chosen as the benchmark date in 
Powley, thus leaving the possibility of inconsistent decisions in the 
future. They conclude that there is much work to be done in recognizing 
and developing Métis rights. 
Jean Teillet’s paper, “Old and Difficult Grievances: Examining the 
Relationship Between the Métis and the Crown”, reviews the decision in 
light of the historical relationship between the Crown and the Métis.49 
She finds that section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 has so far failed 
in its purpose of resolving “old and difficult grievances” between the 
Métis and the Crown arising from the Crown’s historical refusal to deal 
with the Métis as a people. In Teillet’s estimation, Powley confirms that 
the Crown owes the Métis a duty of consultation and accommodation. In 
her view, this duty is still not being met. 
In his paper “Negotiations With Métis: What Courts Can Do to 
Help,” Shin Imai argues that negotiation and litigation must play com-
plementary roles in determining the framework of Métis rights.50 He 
suggests that the principle established in Doucet-Boudreau to the ef-
fect that superior courts may retain jurisdiction to supervise the ongo-
ing implementation of a judicial order should be expanded to allow 
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courts to supervise ongoing negotiations between the Crown and the 
Métis. Under this model, the role of the courts would be to assign 
rights to the Crown and to the Métis in its decisions, and then to re-
main in a supervisory position to establish a negotiation process and 
ensure the integrity of negotiations. This context would allow greater 
success in the negotiations.  
Teillet, Imai and Sterling and Lemmond all emphasize the difficulty 
and necessity of identifying Métis communities and defining what con-
stitutes individual membership in those communities. They report that at 
present, individuals seeking to exercise Métis rights are required to 
prove their family’s genealogy for several generations. This clearly 
imposes a difficult burden on claimants. All these writers suggest that 
extensive political negotiations will be required to develop a framework 
that allows individuals to exercise their Métis Aboriginal rights without 
having to meet an unduly onerous burden of proof. 
III. FEDERALISM 
Although there were no major developments in the area of federal-
ism in 2003, several federalism decisions were released, the most note-
worthy being Unifund Assurance and Paul.  
Unifund Assurance arose from a motor vehicle accident in British 
Columbia that involved Ontario residents who were vacationing there. 
The Ontario residents successfully sued in B.C. for damages, and also 
received statutory accident benefits from their Ontario insurance com-
pany. The amount of the accident benefits received from the Ontario 
insurer was deducted from the damages payable by the B.C. insurer. The 
Ontario insurer brought an action in Ontario against the B.C. insurer, 
seeking to be reimbursed for the amount it had paid the Ontario resi-
dents, on grounds that the B.C. insurer had received a ‘windfall’ by 
being allowed to set off the money paid in Ontario from the B.C. 
award.51 The Supreme Court of Canada, by a narrow 4-3 margin, held 
that the accident in question did not have a “real and substantial connec-
tion” with Ontario and, accordingly, Ontario legislation could not be 
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applied so as to permit the Ontario insurer to claim reimbursement from 
the B.C. insurer.52 While the facts of the case are complicated, and thus 
potentially of limited application in future litigation, the case is never-
theless noteworthy in the sense that it represents one of the few recent 
cases in which the territorial jurisdiction of a province has been held to 
limit the reach of provincial legislation and the jurisdiction of provincial 
superior courts.53  
Finally, the Court also released its decision in Paul giving the B.C. 
Forest Appeals Commission the authority to decide questions of Abo-
riginal rights that arise incidentally to forestry matters. In this case 
Thomas Paul, who was a registered Indian, had been charged under 
B.C.’s Forest Practices Code with cutting Crown timber illegally. Paul 
asserted that he had a constitutionally protected Aboriginal right to cut 
timber for house modification. At issue was whether the Forest Appeals 
Commission, a provincial statutory body, had jurisdiction to hear and 
decide, at first instance, whether this defence applied. In holding that the 
Commission did have the necessary jurisdiction, the Supreme Court 
reinforced its recent decision in Kitkatla Band v. British Columbia (Min-
ister of Small Business, Tourism and Culture),54 which recognized pro-
vincial authority to apply laws to Aboriginal peoples, provided that 
these laws do not infringe section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 and 
do not touch on the “core of Indianness”.  
IV. UNANIMITY AND DISSENT IN 2003 CONSTITUTIONAL CASES 
This year, the Court was unanimous in 17 out of the 24 (or 71 per 
cent) of the constitutional cases it decided. The percentage of unani-
mous decisions was considerably higher than that in 2002, when the 
Court was unanimous in only 14 out of 23 (or 61 per cent) of the cases it 
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decided.55 Although these figures seem to indicate that the Court is 
reaching agreement in a greater number of cases, a review of unanimity 
rates since 1995 indicates that the Court released split decisions in a 
disproportionately high number of cases in 2002 (see Table 1 below). 
2003 represented a return to more typical rates of unanimity. Overall, 
since Justice Beverley McLachlin became Chief Justice in 2000, the 
Court has been unanimous in about two-thirds of its constitutional deci-
sions (53/78 or 68 per cent unanimous). 
Table 1: Unanimous versus Split Decisions in all Constitutional 
Cases 1995-2003 (includes Federalism, Aboriginal and Charter 
decisions) 
Year Unanimous Split Percentage 
Unanimous 
1995 17 9 65 % 
1996 28 10 74 % 
1997 14 8 64 % 
1998 12 9 57 % 
1999 11 7 61 % 
2000 8 4 67 % 
2001 14 5 74 % 
2002 14 9 61 % 
2003 17 7 71 % 
 
While recognizing that the significant majority of cases are unani-
mous, it nevertheless is of interest to track the degree to which individ-
ual members of the Court dissent in constitutional cases. In fact, the 
most frequent dissenters in constitutional cases during the “McLachlin 
Court” have been Arbour and LeBel JJ., each having dissented 10 times 
during this period, while the least frequent dissenters were Gonthier and 
Iacobucci JJ.56 Also of interest is the fact that dissents in constitutional 
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cases are much more likely to favour claimants as opposed to govern-
ments, with about two-thirds of the dissents over the last four years 
(41/59) favouring claimants. Indeed, over the past four years only 
Gonthier J. dissented more often in favour of governments rather than 
claimants. This voting pattern is subject to a variety of interpretations. 
However, it would seem that in cases where the Court is divided, the 
dissent is likely to take a more expansive or favourable view of the 
claimant’s position than is the Court’s majority. Overall, however, the 
most striking aspect of these figures is the relatively low level of dissent 
and the continuing high degree of consensus in constitutional decisions 
of the Supreme Court of Canada.  
Table 2: Dissents in Constitutional Cases on the McLachlin Court – 
January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2003 
Justice Dissents Direction of Dissent 
(Favoured 
Claim/Challenge) 
Direction of Dissent 
(Opposed 
Claim/Challenge) 
McLachlin C.J. 6 5 1 
Gonthier J. 3 0 3 
Iacobucci J. 5 5 0 
Major J. 8 4 4 
Bastarache J. 6 3 3 
Binnie J. 7 5 2 
Arbour J. 10 10 0 
LeBel J. 10 7 3 
Deschamps J. 4 2 2 
V. CONCLUSION 
Several articles in the next volume analyze and critique the overall 
approach taken by the Court to Charter claims in 2003. In commenting 
generally on the jurisprudence, Danielle Pinard addresses the role facts 
and evidence play in determining where decisions should be placed on 
the spectrum from activism to restraint.57 Her focus is on methodology 
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and, from that perspective, she contends that activism is strongest when 
it flows from unpredictability. In her view, the Court’s power to decide 
and modify methodological requirements as cases arise and unfold is the 
power to pave the way to the desired result. It is a power that Pinard 
regards as dangerous. After illustrating the point by reviewing the 
Court’s methodology in some of the 2003 cases, she suggests that the 
need for flexibility should not be an excuse for arbitrariness, and adds 
that to stay within its institutional boundaries, the Court must make use 
of intelligible principles in its decision making.   
Looking ahead, Grant Huscroft uses the upcoming Same Sex Refer-
ence to explore and reflect on the debilitating effect judicial exclusivity 
in Charter interpretation can have on the political process.58 He is criti-
cal of the Ontario Court of Appeal’s remedial order in Halpern v. Can-
ada, which struck down the common law definition of marriage without 
providing an opportunity for Parliament to consider whether to enact 
legislation in light of the invalidity of the common law definition, a 
result he considers contemptuous of the democratic processes that were 
underway.59 He is equally critical of the federal government for post-
poning a legislative response to the Court of Appeal and asking the 
Supreme Court questions to which Huscroft believes it knows the an-
swers. Not only does he regard the strategy as disingenuous politically, 
he concludes that it undermines Parliament’s status as a constitutional 
actor. He notes that political inertia on rights-based issues is a problem, 
but demonstrates that the Court is as much a part of the problem as the 
solution. Democracy is not for the faint-hearted and, in his view, the 
challenge for the Supreme Court is to ensure there is more to democratic 
constitutionalism than simply judicial review. 
Allan Hutchinson writes that to accept the political nature of adjudi-
cation does not strike the death-knell for democracy.60 He suggests that 
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the appropriate inquiry in a constitutional democracy is not whether the 
courts have acted politically, but whether the political choices they 
make will serve democracy. The real issue is not the politicization of the 
judiciary, but the democratic failure of the executive and legislative 
branches to fulfill their constitutional responsibilities and mandate. 
By far the biggest development at the Supreme Court of Canada in 
recent months is the retirements of Arbour and Iacobucci JJ., both of 
whom retired in June 2004. At the commencement of the Court’s fall 
2004 term, four out of the nine justices will have been members for less 
than two years.61 This is the largest proportion of relatively inexperi-
enced justices on the Court since 1990, when five judges had less than 
two years of experience.62 Also of significance is the fact that the two 
new appointments are to be selected on the basis of a more transparent 
selection process.  
In a speech delivered at Osgoode Hall Law School in October 2002, 
Paul Martin proposed that Parliament have an advisory role in reviewing 
appointments to the Supreme Court, but he did not specify what such a 
role might entail. Following his appointment as Prime Minister in De-
cember 2003, Prime Minister Martin asked the Standing Committee on 
Justice, Human Rights, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to 
review and report on how best to implement a system of prior review of 
Supreme Court of Canada appointments. The Committee held hearings 
in early 2004 and reported in May 2004.63 The focus of the debate be-
fore the Committee was whether to recommend a public hearing in 
which a prospective candidate for appointment to the Supreme Court 
would be interviewed. The Justice Committee recommended against 
such a public hearing, proposing, instead, that as an interim measure the 
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Minister of Justice appear before the Justice Committee to discuss the 
process by which the current vacancies on the Court were filled and the 
qualifications of the two appointees. On a longer-term basis, the Justice 
Committee proposed creating an Advisory Committee, composed of 
representatives of the parties with official standing in the House of 
Commons, representatives of the provinces, members of the judiciary 
and lay members. The Advisory Committee would deliberate in private 
and would compile a short list of names of appointees which would be 
provided to the Minister of Justice and from which the selection would 
be made.  
The Justice Committee’s recommendations are consistent with the 
proposals put forward by Ontario Attorney General Michael Bryant in 
his contribution to this volume.64 He explains that what is at stake is the 
relationship between the branches of government that form the basic 
structure of our society, and states that in considering changes to the 
appointment process, we should proceed with caution. The Attorney 
General is concerned by the prospect of replacing Canada’s process with 
the American approach. In his view this would be a mistake because it 
might create expectations and a mandate for the nominee: a future in 
which Canada’s judges are forced to be politicians with robes on. He 
urges us not to confuse transparency which focuses on the judge and 
strikes at the impartiality of the judiciary, with transparency of the proc-
ess, which makes sense.  
As of this writing (July 2004), the Prime Minister has yet to indicate 
the manner in which greater transparency in the appointment process 
will be achieved. It will be interesting to observe whether the fact that a 
minority government was returned in the June 2004 federal election will 
influence the degree to which a Parliamentary committee is provided 
with the opportunity to review potential Supreme Court appointees, 
since the government will no longer control a majority on House com-
mittees. What is clear is that any change in the process of appointment 
could have significant implications for the long-term composition and 
performance of the Court and, thus, must be approached with great care 
and caution. 
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